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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with overtures from President Nixon and Secretary of
State Kissinger towards China in the 1970s, the U.S.-China relationship
has been an endless source of fascination and tension. Trade between the
United States and China accounts for much of this drama. Entrepreneurs
have scrambled to make fortunes in China,' while the United States has
advocated further market access for U.S. goods. Complaints that U.S.
jobs have been lost to China contrast with higher than average domestic
* LLM Candidate, Tsinghua University Law School, Beijing; JD 2006, University of
Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor; MA 2003, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS), Washington DC. I would like to thank my family, the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, and Professors Reuven Avi-Yonah, Timothy L. Dickinson, Robert L.
Howse, and Liya Rong for their guidance and support. All errors are my own, omario@umich.edu.
1. G. Pascal Zachary, How Americans are Making Millions in China, Bus. 2.0 MAG.,
Aug. 2005, at 58, 59.
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wages for U.S. firms engaged in international trade or investment activi-
ties in China. Meanwhile, U.S. government lawyers analyze trade data
to support potential complaints against China in the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO).'
The United States has benefited significantly from trade with China,
gaining access to low-cost consumer and industrial goods, and achieving
economic growth while maintaining stable inflation. The United States
and China together represent approximately half of the global economic
growth in the last four years.4 In 2005, China was the fourth-largest ex-
port market for the United States. Only four years before that, China was
the ninth-largest U.S. export market.5 China now ranks with the Euro-
pean Union, Japan, and the NAFTA countries in trade with the United
States. In July 2006, the U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for Interna-
tional Trade predicted that China would soon be the third-largest market
for U.S. goods and services. 6 Of total U.S. imports since 1995, China's
share has increased from 5.8 percent to 14.6 percent
China's trade with the United States began at a modest 1.1 million
dollars in 1978, with the United States exporting four-fifths of that to
China.8 By 1990, U.S.-China trade had reached twenty billion dollars,
three-fourths of which China exported to the United States. 9 This trade
explosion conflicted with public calls to halt trade relations with China
after the Tiananmen Square episode the preceding year. The imbalance
in trade in goods has increased dramatically-in 2005 the United States
imported Chinese goods worth 243 billion dollars and exported goods
worth forty-one billion dollars, resulting in a deficit of 202 billion dol-
lars.' o The 2006 deficit is well on its way to surpassing that of 2005, with
the deficit at the end of June 2006 11.5 billion dollars higher than the
same 2005 figure."
2. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: ENTERING
A NEW PHASE OF GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT -TP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW
7 (2006) [hereinafter USTR 2006 TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.
6. U.S. Sees China to be the Third Largest Export Market Soon, THE CHINA
PERSPECTIVE, July 25, 2006, http://www.thechinaperspective.com/articles/usseeschinato
bethethirdlargestexportmarketsoon/index.html; see also Sino-US Trade is Highly Recip-
rocal, PEOPLE'S DAILY, April 26, 2000, http://English.people.com.cn/English/200004/26/
eng20000426_39771 .html.
7. USTR 2006 TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW, supra note 2, at 4.
8. DAVID H. LAMPTON, SAME BED, DIFFERENT DREAMS: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE
AMERICAN BANK OF COMMERCE, 1919-1937, at 380, tbl.2 (2001).





Enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in China has
proven to be a formidable challenge and a top priority for U.S. policy-
makers. Ambassador Rob Portman, the former United States Trade
Representative (USTR), has likened IPR infringement in China to out-
right theft.12 Congress, prompted by U.S. industry, frequently raises the
issue of IPR infringement in China. Members of Congress have com-
plained that reports of IPR infringement arrive almost daily and that little
has been done about it.'3 Others allege corruption or foul play,
4 self-
interested Chinese enforcement,'5 and outright attack on the U.S. enter-
tainment industry. 6 Senator Gordon Smith has implied that if the United
States had another chance at negotiating China's WTO entry, the out-
come might be different.'
7
Such acrimony over Chinese IPR enforcement has the potential to un-
dermine bipartisan support for trade agreements.' 8 Prior to President
Bush's visit to China in November 2005, the President received a letter
from fourteen Senators asking him to take action against China's rampant
IPR infringement.' 9 The USTR has received individual communications
from members of Congress on the IP issue as well.20 In light of ongoing IP
piracy in China and the obvious political importance of this issue in the
United States, a review of China's obligations under the WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)-and its
efforts to uphold those obligations-is in order.
This Note will explore the extent to which China is in violation of its
obligations under TRIPs. Section I surveys the current state of IPR in-
fringement in China. Section II analyzes relevant TRIPs provisions, case
law, and treaties that supplement TRIPs provisions. Section III analyzes
Chinese criminal law, the December 2004 Judicial Interpretation of
12. Nomination of Hon. Robert J. Portman to be U.S. Trade Representative: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) [hereinafter Portman Confirmation
Hearing].
13. Id. at3.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 34.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id.
18. Nominations of Hon. James S. Halpern, to be Judge of the U.S. Tax Court; Hon.
Karan K. Bhatia, to be Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, with the Rank of Ambassador; Hon.
Susan C. Schwab, to be Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, with the Rank of Ambassador;
Hon. Franklin L Lavin, to be Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade; and Clay
Lowery, to be Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on
Finance, 109th Cong. 19 (2005) (statement of Sen. Gordon Smith).
19. See Letter from U.S. Senate to George W. Bush, President of the United States
(Nov. 10, 2005) (on file with the Office of the USTR).
20. See Letter from Howard Berman, Congressman, to Robert Portman, USTR (Oct.
17, 2005) (on file with the Office of the USTR); letter from Mary Bono, Congresswoman, to
Robert Portman, USTR (Oct. 27, 2005) (on file with the Office of the USTR).
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Chinese criminal law, and Chinese IP law as they pertain to IPR in-
fringement. Section IV outlines enforcement efforts in China against the
backdrop of the law analyzed in the previous section. Section V evalu-
ates these enforcement efforts given China's capabilities and obligations,
and Section VI concludes that China would have difficulty defending
against a TRIPs action in the WTO.
I. THE PIRATE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?
China's IPR infringement extends beyond the familiar complaints of
the U.S. entertainment industry. Clearly, counterfeit compact discs (CDs)
and digital video discs (DVDs) reduce revenue for recording artists, pro-
ducers, and actors, but infringement of IPR in China also includes
industries such as automotive and aviation parts manufacturing and
pharmaceuticals manufacturing.2' IPR infringement therefore has the
potential to affect health and safety, in addition to revenue streams,
within and beyond China's borders.
IPR infringement is pervasive in China and exacerbates the U.S.
trade deficit. If Chinese consumers purchased more legal copies of soft-
ware and entertainment media, revenues from technology licenses,
entertainment royalties, and publishing copyrights could relieve the trade
deficit by as much as 2.5-3.8 billion dollars annually.22 China's State
Council estimated the 2001 value of pirated goods in China at between
nineteen and twenty-four billion dollars,23 which translates to approxi-
mately one-fourth of the 2001 U.S.-China trade deficit.24 Assuming
infringement was constant from 2001 through 2005, annual relief would
represent potentially one-fifth of the 2005 U.S.-China trade deficit of
202 billion dollars. IPR infringement, however, appears to have wors-
ened. Sixty-seven percent of IPR seizures by U.S. Customs in 2004-
worth 134 million dollars-came from China, up from ninety-four mil-
lion dollars worth in 2003, a forty-seven percent increase.25 Piracy could
therefore currently represent one-fourth or more of the U.S.-China trade
deficit.
21. USTR, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE 63 (2004).
22. Id.
23. USTR, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE 76 (2005),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2005/asset_
uploadfile293-8580.pdf.
24. The 2001 U.S.-China deficit was approximately $83.6 billion. Robert E. Scott,
U.S.-China Trade 1989-2003: Impact on Jobs & Industries, Nationally and State-by-State 4
(Econ. Policy Inst. Working Paper No. 270, 2005), http://www.epinet.org/workingpapers/epi-
wp270.pdf.
25. USTR, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 2 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 SPECIAL 301 RE-
PORT].
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A. Software, Songs, and Silver Screens
A five-minute stroll through city streets in China yields significant
evidence of the production and distribution of pirated media. Entertain-
ment and software industries face a staggering piracy rate of between
26
eighty-five and ninety-five percent. U.S. copyright associations esti-
mate total losses to piracy in 2004 in excess of 2.5 billion dollars.
7
These figures suggest that at this point virtually no legitimate market
exists for the entertainment and software industries in China. Equally
striking is the fact that China is the world's sixth-largest market for per-
sonal computers, while it ranks twenty-sixth for legitimate software
sales. The stark contrast explains why U.S. business software publishers
lost 1.47 billion dollars to IPR infringement in 2004.28
China's WTO commitments under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) allow for twenty foreign films to be imported annu-
ally;2 9 U.S. film producers export less than that number to China. Non-
quota films are thus in high demand, a demand that pirates supply. Until
the twenty quota films pass censorship processes, pirates supply those
films as well.30 Eighty-three government-licensed optical disc factories in
China produce pirated DVDs." The price differential between pirated
and legitimate products ensures that once a pirated film reaches the mar-
ket, its legitimate counterpart will not be able to compete.
Any reduction in IPR infringement has been negligible. The Re-
cording Industry Association of America (RIAA) reported that the piracy
rate in China decreased from ninety percent in 2003 to eighty-five per-
cent in 2004. The Motion Picture Association reported that during the
first three quarters of 2003, customs officials in the United Kingdom
26. Examples of such associations are the Business Software Alliance, the Motion
Picture Association of America, and the Association of American Publishers and the Re-
cording Industry Association of America.
27. Intellectual Property Protection as Economic Policy: Will China Ever Enforce Its IP
Laws?: Roundtable Before the Congressional-Executive Commission China, 109th Cong. 7
(2005) [hereinafter CECC IP Roundtable] (testimony of Eric H. Smith, President, Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Alliance).
28. Id. at 2.
29. WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services Communication, Schedule of Spe-
cific Commitments on Trade in Services, P.R.C., § D, GATS/SC/135 at 21 (Feb. 14, 2002)
[hereinafter China's GATS Commitments].
30. 2004 Transitional Review Mechanism: Hearing Before the Council on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 203, IP/C/M/46 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 TRMs]
(meeting minutes). See detailed discussion on the 2003-05 TRMs, infra, Section IV.
31. CECC IP Roundtable, supra note 27, at 7.
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seized over 79,000 Chinese origin DVDs.32 Pirated Chinese exports reach
over twenty industrialized and developing countries.33
B. Auto and Aviation Parts
Chinese IPR infringement affects the auto and aviation industries as
well.34 The Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)
estimates that counterfeiting costs the auto industry twelve billion dol-
lars annually.35 Safety is an even greater concern than the economic
losses of counterfeit auto or aviation parts. The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) estimates that over 500,000 airline parts sold each
year are counterfeit, representing two percent of total parts sold annu-
ally.36 A Norwegian airliner crashed in 1989 due to counterfeit parts-all
fifty-five aboard died when the aircraft disintegrated 22,000 feet above
the North Sea.3 7 Counterfeit propellers, propeller pitch-control units, and
engine bearings all have led to fatal crashes. 38 Brian Duggan of MEMA
recounted a fatal 2004 vehicle fire in which the counterfeit brake pads
had been lined with dried grass.3 9 In 1987, seven children died when the
bus they were in flipped over because, even though the brakes had a
well-known trademark affixed to them, they were made of sawdust.40
MEMA estimates that almost seventy percent of counterfeit imports
into the United States originated in China and an additional ten percent
from Hong Kong.4 In February 2005 Chinese authorities seized 1.2 mil-
lion dollars of counterfeit auto parts bearing Japanese trademarks. 4 A
global auto parts manufacturing company cited two cases in which a to-
32. INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS'N [IIPA], SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON GLOBAL COPY-
RIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 34 (2004), http://www.iipa.com/special301_TOCs/
2004_SPEC301_TOC.html.
33. Int'l Anticounterfeiting Coalition [IACC], Submission of the IACC to the USTR:
Special 301 Recommendations, 13 (2005), http://www.iacc.org/resources/2005_USTR_ Spe-
cial301 .pdf.
34. U.S. Embassy in China, Industry Specific Issues, Automotive IPR Initiative, Dec. 5,
2005, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/iprindustry.html.
35. MOTOR AND EQUIP. MFRS. ASS'N, COUNTERFEITING: CRIME OF THE 21ST CENTURY
8, http://www.mema.org/cmspages/getAttch.php?id=33.
36. IACC, WHITE PAPER-THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT: ECONOMIC HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND
SAFETY, AND LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2005) [here-
inafter IACC WHITE PAPER].
37. Willy Stem, Warning! Bogus Parts Have Turned Up in Commercial Jets. Where's
the FAA?, Bus. WK., June 12, 1996, http://www.businessweek.com1996/24/b34791.htm.
38. Id.
39. MOTOR AND EQUIP. MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 35, at 7.
40. IACC WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 10.
41. MOTOR AND EQUIP. MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 35, at 6. The data does not differenti-
ate between auto and non-auto counterfeit items.
42. See Details of 1O Major IPR Piracy Cases Released in China, ASIA PULSE, Nov. 17,
2005.
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tal of 68,000 counterfeit boxes were found, ready to receive counterfeit
product. 3 Counterfeit plaques were also included to convince consumers
that the products were certified. A total fine of 7,500 dollars was as-
sessed, and no proceeds of the fines were shared with the company.
China is the fifth-largest auto parts supplier to the United States,
with companies such as General Motors aiming to spend four billion
dollars by 2009 for parts production and subsequent export 
from China. 44
With China-based production of such products comes the significant
danger of information transfer, since much of China's counterfeiting
arises from the process of reverse engineering-the part is purchased,
disassembled, copied, and then reassembled. Such methods of informa-
tion transfer are generally not considered protected by intellectual
property law.
C. Drugs
The production, distribution, and export of counterfeit pharmaceuti-
cal products is another area of significant IPR piracy in China.
5
Counterfeit Chinese pharmaceuticals have reached fifty countries.
46 In
November 2002, the Chinese State Drug Administration closed 1,300
illegal factories and examined drugs worth fifty-seven million dollars.
47
As many as 192,000 people may have died in China due to counterfeit
drugs in 2001 .8 To the credit of the Chinese authorities, this figure was
featured on the Shenzhen Evening News. Infants were the victims of a
2004 scheme of counterfeit formula that resulted in dozens of deaths.
49 In
43. Pirates of the 21st Century: The Curse of the Black Market: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, the Fed. Workforce, and the District of
Columbia of the Sen. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Phillip Rotman, Assistant Patent & Trademark Counsel, Dana Corp.)
[hereinafter Rotman Statement], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse
action=Hearings.Testimony&HearinglD=l 69&WitnesslD=610.
44. U.S. EMBASSY IN CHINA, supra note 34.
45. Counterfeit drugs can include drugs with nongenuine but harmless ingredients,
drugs with nongenuine and dangerous ingredients, or drugs with an increased (and thus un-
safe) dosage level of genuine ingredients. Examples of harmless ingredients can include
talcum powder or sugar. False and dangerous ingredients have included an antifreeze ingredi-
ent instead of normal ingredients in cough syrup (which killed infants in Haiti and India in
1995 and 1998, respectively). See World Health Organization [WHO], Substandard and Coun-
terfeit Medicines, Fact Sheet No. 275, Feb. 2006, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact
sheets/fs275/en/.
46. Anne Stevenson-Yang & Ken DeWoskin, China Destroys the IP Paradigm, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Mar. 2005, at 9, 11.
47. WHO, supra note 45.
48. MICHELE FORZLEY, INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST. [IIPI], COUNTERFEIT GOODS
AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH AND SAFETY 33 (2003), http://www.iipi.org/reports/Counterfeit-
Goods.pdf.
49. See IACC WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 13, n.48.
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Japan, "diet pills" from China led to four deaths and over 150 cases of
illness." Johnson & Johnson has pursued thirty-eight criminal cases in
China against counterfeit products that copied the Johnson & Johnson
brand name."
Industry experts estimate that China is responsible for thirty percent
of the world's counterfeit drug trade.52 Joint sting operations in 2005 re-
sulted in seizures valued at 9.3 million dollars. 3 The concern is serious
enough that Pfizer opened a testing facility in Dalian, China, to monitor
counterfeiting.54 Chinese stores sell versions of Viagra named Vyagra
King and USA Vager 777, which store owners claim are seventy percent
"real. 55 The difference in sales of Viagra between the United States and
China underscores the extent of the counterfeit drug problem. The
United States, with approximately one-fourth of China's population,
purchased almost 900 million dollars of Viagra in 2004. That same year,
China purchased only five million dollars worth. Counterfeit drugs are at
least partly responsible for that gap. 6
II. WTO TRIPs LAW AND SUPPORTING TEXTS
A. DEER Rights
Article 41 of the WTO TRIPs Agreement provides the main thrust of
IPR enforcement requirements. Specifically, Article 41 (1) indicates that:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified
in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective
action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious reme-
dies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a
deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be ap-
plied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to
50. Chinese Diet Pill Casualties Mount, CNN.coM, July 21, 2002, http://archives.cnn.
comi/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/21/japan.pills/.
51. IACC WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 8.
52. David Griesing & Bruce Japsen, Pharmaceutical Companies Feeling Potent Effect




56. See Details of 10 Major IPR Piracy Cases, supra note 42.
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legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their
abuse. 7
The key elements of Article 41 are deterrence, enforcement and expedi-
tious remedies ("DEER" rights). DEER rights ensure that a rights holder
can rely on a WTO member's justice system to enforce IPR protections.
DEER rights are fundamental to attracting and retaining durable foreign
direct investment. Furthermore, the WTO considers DEER rights mutu-
ally exclusive and nonredundant.58 This conveys to WTO members the
clear message that significant efforts are expected to establish robust
DEER rights.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have construed the provisions
of Article 41 within the spirit of the entire TRIPs Agreement. In United
States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, the panel
commented on the necessary availability of civil judicial procedures as
an element of TRIPs Articles 41 and 42.9 The Appellate Body advanced
the panel's finding in ruling that the availability of civil judicial proce-
dures meant that they must be "obtainable" and "within one's reach."
6°
This interpretation invokes the judicial procedural requirements of Arti-
cle 42 in support of the general conditions of enforcement and
expeditious remedies for protection in Article 41.
In European Communities-Protection Of Trademarks And Geo-
graphical Indications For Agricultural Products And Foodstuffs,6' the
panel reiterated that Article 41 encompasses nonredundant IPR provi-
sions and provides support to the Article 62(4) provision for acquisition
and maintenance of IPR as well as inter partes procedures regarding
IPR. The WTO has provided little further guidance on the descriptions
and definitions of Article 41 DEER rights, which is due in part to the
lack of disputes centered on Article 41. The WTO Analytical Index also
does not provide further clarifications on Article 41 's DEER rights.
57. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, art 41(1) (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs].
58. Panel Report, European Communities-Protection Of Trademarks And Geographi-
cal Indications For Agricultural Products And Foodstuffs, 7.48, WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15,
2005).
59. Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
1$ 8.97, 8.111, WT/DS 176/R (Aug. 6, 2001).
60. Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, IN 214-17, WT/DS 176/AB/R (Feb. 1, 2002).
61. Panel Report, EC-Protection Of Trademarks, 7.48, WT/DS290/R (March 15,
2005).
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B. Damages, Other Remedies
The TRIPs Agreement is, however, clear on how a WTO member
should calculate damages. Article 45 indicates that damages must ade-
quately remedy the rights holder's injury and should be calculated on the
basis of the production cost and subsequent price of the genuine prod-
uct. 62 "Adequate" damages under this formulation are delineated
independently from the recovery of profits, and therefore clearly favor
the rights holder. The second paragraph of Article 45 calls for the recov-
ery of profits only in cases where the infringer unintentionally used or
stole the intellectual property-profit seizure is justified only by the lack
of mens rea on the part of the would-be pirate.
Article 46 expands on the concept of deterrence, identifying proce-
dures necessary to stop pirates. It gives authorities the power to seize
infringing goods and dispose them outside the channels of commerce, it
rejects the mere removal of an unlawfully-affixed trademark and the sub-
sequent release of goods into channels of commerce as adequate action,
and it empowers authorities to seize the instruments predominantly used
to produce infringing goods.63 Similarly, Article 59 gives competent au-
thorities the power to destroy or dispose of infringing goods.
64
C. Criminal Procedures
Lastly, TRIPs specifies that criminal procedures can (and sometimes
must) be utilized and adjusted for effective deterrence. Article 61 indi-
cates that:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to
be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available
shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to
provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties ap-
plied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases,
remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and
destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and im-
plements the predominant use of which has been in the
commission of the offence. Members may provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of in-
fringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where
they are committed willfully and on a commercial scale.65
62. TRIPs, supra note 57, art. 45.
63. Id. art. 46.
64. Id. art. 59.
65. Id. art. 61.
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Article 61's minimum standard for willful piracy is worth noting.
Criminal authorities must hear cases and administer penalties for willful
piracy on a commercial scale. The finality of this provision is unmistak-
able.
While there is an unfortunate dearth of WTO case law surrounding
the above articles, their message is unequivocal: members must adjust
punishments to guarantee Article 41 DEER rights. In doing so, members
must be mindful of the rights holder's interests. The rights holder's per-
spective is crucial to any action against IP piracy, including calculating
damages, administering appropriate penalties, seizing pirated goods and
instruments used in production, destroying pirated goods or removing
them from channels of commerce, and issuing criminal punishments.
All actions are meant to fulfill the letter and spirit of a member's Article
41 DEER responsibilities.
D. Other Trade Agreements and Commentary
Other IPR-related trade provisions can serve as guides for enforce-
ment and deterrence. The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) provides virtually identical language on DEER rights and ju-
dicial powers to deter IP piracy. NAFTA Article 1714 outlines provisions
for DEER rights,67 and Article 1715(2) requires NAFTA parties to give
judicial authorities the power to issue orders to desist and to dispose of
or prevent entry of infringing goods to the channels of commnerce 6 Arti-
cle 1717 articulates the criminal procedures a party may utilize,
including both imprisonment and monetary fines "sufficient to provide a
deterrent" to IP piracy.69
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement also provides helpful lan-
guage on IPR enforcement. Going beyond the TRIPs Agreement's
provisions for damages, Article 4 states:
Each Party shall ensure that its statutory maximum fines are suf-
ficiently high to deter future acts of infringement with a policy
of removing the monetary incentive to the infringer, and shall
provide its judicial and other competent authorities the authority
to order the seizure of all suspected pirated copyright and coun-
terfeit trademark goods and related implements the predominant
66. Id. arts. 45, 46, 61.
67. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1714(1), 1717(2),
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
68. Id. art. 1715(2).
69. Id. art. 1717(1).
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use of which has been in the commission of the offense, and
documentary evidence.70
These approaches place particular importance on removing the
monetary incentive for the infringer. They also calculate damages using
the value of the genuine item, the suggested retail price of the legitimate
product, or other equivalent measures established by the rights holder-
key elements in protecting IP rights holders.
Various commentators have used piracy levels as the primary indica-
tor of the effectiveness of a country's IPR enforcement regime. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) states that any country
with an audio or video piracy rate of over twenty-five percent or a soft-
ware piracy rate of over forty percent has failed to address piracy
adequately.7 ' Richard M. Krugman, Vice President of Enforcement at the
Business Software Alliance, has said that for deterrence measures to be
deemed effective, "the public must understand and expect that meaning-
ful sanctions will be imposed against those who engage in activities that
rise to the level of criminal violations of the law.' 72 These commentators
agree that punishments for IPR infringement must include the possibility
of imprisonment, without which deterrence is improbable. 3 Civil fines
may only be perceived as a cost of doing business if penalties remain
slight.
III. CHINA'S RELEVANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
A. China's Criminal Law
Criminal law related to IPR infringement in China is problematic.
The section on IPR contains vague terminology and ambiguous en-
forcement approaches, and it relies on profit motives and unclear
thresholds for more severe penalties. While the U.S. legal system cer-
tainly uses some vague terminology, China's overall lack of transparency
makes consistent application of such standards difficult and frustrates the
70. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002).
71. IIPA, Estimates of 1995 U.S. Losses Due To Foreign Piracy and Levels of Foreign
Piracy, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 581 (Doris E. Long & Anthony
D'Amato eds. 2000) (1997).
72. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings on the "No Electronic Theft
Act of 1997," Pub. L. 105-147 (The NET Act) Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 2
(2000) (testimony of Robert M. Kruger, Vice President of Enforcement, Business Software
Alliance), http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/3 23_00/KrugerBSA.PDF
73. Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 18 (1994).
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expectations of rights holders. WTO members are thus forced to hound
China for clarity at WTO compliance hearings in Geneva.4
Article 213 of the Chinese criminal law addresses trademark coun-
terfeiting, imposing a maximum prison sentence of "not more than three
years" for crimes of "serious circumstances."" A prison term of three to
seven years is imposed for "especially/extremely severe circum-
stances." 6 Article 214 addresses the sale of counterfeit trademarks and
again imposes a maximum of up to three years in prison for "relatively
large sales. '77 Three to seven years is required for "huge" sales.78 Article
217 addresses copyright violations, and while it employs similarly am-
biguous language, it also requires that the pirate have a profit motive and
incur relatively large gains in order to be prosecuted.79
B. The December 2004 Judicial Interpretation
In December 2004, the Supreme People's Court took an initial step
toward enhanced criminal enforcement of IPR infringement. The court
issued a Judicial Interpretation (the December 2004 JI) that aimed to
clarify Chinese criminal law and extend the reach of China's legal sys-
tem to IPR pirates. 0 Some improvements included: 1) creating criminal
liability for those who assist in piracy, including landlords and creditors;
2) counting the value of unsold and idle pirated stock towards sales cal-
culations; and 3) counting advertising revenues as profits in the sector of
Internet piracy."' In direct contrast to these three improvements, however,
the December 2004 JI also imposed criminal thresholds more severely
for business units than for individuals,82 penalized copyright infringers
74. See the discussion of the 2003-05 WTO Transitional Review Mechanism Hearings
(TRMs), infra Part IV.
75. See Criminal Law (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1997), arts. 213-220 (P.R.C.) (section of criminal law addressing "Crimes Of
Infringing On Intellectual Property Rights"), available at http://www.abailaw.com/xingfa/xing
faxiu.htm, translated at http://english.people.com.cn/datallaws/detail.php?id=4 .
76. Translated from the Chinese by the author. The same English translations are used
for the December 2004 JI.
77. See Criminal Law (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective




80. See Interpretation of the Concrete Application of the Law in Handling Criminal
Cases of Intellectual Property Infringement (issued by the Jud. Comm. of the Sup. People's
Ct., Nov. 2, 2004 & the Procuratorial Comm. of the Sup. People's Procuratorate, Nov. 11,
2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004.) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter December 2004 JI], http://www.chinaipr
law.com/english/lawslaws20.htm.
81. Id. arts. 11-12, 16.
82. Id. art. 15. Ironically, this gives pirating businesses the leeway to invest in infra-
structure and stay in business, as long as piracy levels are kept below the generous threshold.
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only if they sought profit,83 and used the price of infringing goods rather
than legitimate goods as the basis for determining whether criminal
thresholds have been met.84
The December 2004 JI offered numerical thresholds to clarify the
Chinese criminal code's arbitrary language. The following numerical
thresholds apply to copyright piracy:"5
Individuals Business Units Profit Gain Punishment
over 1,000 copies over 3,000 copies over RMB30,000 not more than
3 years'
imprisonment
over 5,000 copies over 15,000 over RMB250,000 3-7 years'
copies imprisonment
The JI offered the following thresholds for trademark piracy:
86
Individuals Business Units Profit Gain Punishment
over 20,000 over 3,000 copies over RMB30,O00 not more than
copies 3 years'
imprisonment
over 100,000 over 15,000 over RMB150,000 3-7 years'
copies copies imprisonment
The December 2004 JI is problematic for other reasons. Article 12
defined "copy" strictly in reference to trademark copies and not in rela-
tion to copyright or patent infringement. Production levels, costs, and
profit projections-and thus the value of the original item---can certainly
differ if the copy is that of a music CD, film DVD, or entertainment or
business software. Critics also point to the arbitrary thresholds and note
that business units can manufacture 2,950 copies of pirated media and
yet escape criminal sanction.
China also continues to use profits as the basis for criminal liability.
Articles 1-3 of the December 2004 JI used profit thresholds of 50,000-
250,000 renminbi (approximately 6,200-31,000 dollars), implying that if
the amount of illegal business is under 50,000 renminbi, nothing will be
done. China and Vietnam are the only countries that use this method of
817criminal IPR enforcement. Moreover, profits are calculated using the
pirated value, not the genuine value of the goods.8 Industry leaders have
noted that such methods are ineffective and do not protect the rights
83. Id. arts. 5-6.
84. Id. art. 9.
85. Id. art. 5.
86. Id. art. 5.
87. IACC WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 8.
88. December 2004 JI, supra note 80, art. 15.
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holder, who is forced to calculate profit and loss margins on the basis of
genuine product value. 9
C. China's Trademark, Copyright, and Patent Laws
China's IP laws do not send a clear message to pirates or rights hold-
ers. This ambiguity assists pirates more than IP rights holders. Article 56
of the Chinese Trademark Law states that the infringer's profit is used to
calculate damages,' leaving the investment in infringing infrastructure
untouched. Article 59 allows prosecution of pirates where the case is "so
serious as to constitute a crime,"9' which simultaneously implies that IP
piracy and criminality can be mutually exclusive and fails to establish a
threshold for criminality.
China's Patent Law goes slightly further in definition but achieves
little clarity. Article 58 restricts any fine to no more than three times the
pirate's illegal income. The fine can be imposed in addition to any calcu-
lated damages.92 Article 60 uses either the losses suffered by the patentee
or the pirate's profits in calculating damage amounts.93 Neither category
is given priority over the other. Article 58 also invokes the dichotomy
between infringement and crime that appeared in the Trademark Law.
9
4
China's Copyright Law is similar. Article 47 authorizes seizure of illegal
income and prosecution when and if the copyright infringement
constitutes a crime. It also authorizes the seizure of materials, tools, and
equipment used to manufacture the infringing copyright material. No
seizure of the actual infringing products is mentioned, nor is illegal in-
come defined anywhere in the law. China also issued Computer Software
Protection Regulations in 2001 that have been labeled inadequate. 96 Spe-
cifically, the regulations imply that temporary copies of software are not
protected, they allow for liability exceptions where the corporate end-
user claims ignorance, and they protect the infringer if great loss is suf-
fered due to destruction of the illegally utilized software.
97
89. Cf. Rotman Statement, supra note 43.
90. Trademark Law (as amended by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct.
27, 2001) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/englishlawsIlaws 11 .htm.
91. Id. art. 59.
92. Patent Law (as amended by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 25,
2000) (P.R.C.), http://www.chinaiprlaw.comenglish/laws/laws4.htm.
93. Id. art. 60.
94. Id. art. 58.
95. Copyright Law (as amended by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27,
2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/englishlaws/laws 10.htm.
96. See CECC IP Roundtable, supra note 27, at 75-76 (excerpts of AmCham-China
and AmCham-Shanghai's Draft 2005 White Paper concerning Intellectual Property Rights
issues).
97. Id.
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IV. GOOD COP OR BAD COP? CHINESE ENFORCEMENT OF IP RIGHTS
We don't want to ignore counterfeiting, but for those foreign
companies, when they enter the Chinese market, I'm afraid they
should also pay some cost due to the realities of China.
-Gao Feng, head of China's anticounterfeiting police unit.9"
Enforcement of IP rights in China has been inconsistent and has
yielded mixed results at best. In a 2004 survey of American Chamber of
Commerce members, two-thirds of respondents stated that China's IPR
enforcement efforts were ineffectual. 99 In another survey by the U.S.-
China Business Council, almost half of the respondents said that the Ju-
dicial Interpretation of 2004 improved IPR enforcement somewhat,
while almost the same number responded that the Judicial Interpretation
did not help at all. No respondents said that the Judicial Interpretation
helped in any major way.'0° In an April 2004 U.S.-China Joint Commis-
sion on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) meeting, Chinese Vice-Premier
Wu Yi promised a substantial reduction in IPR infringement, improved
legal measures, and increased enforcement activities.'' To verify Vice-
Premier Wu's promises, the Bush Administration conducted an out-of-
cycle review to evaluate China's implementation of its IPR commitment.
This 2005 "Special 301 Report" gave China a failing grade. 0 2 Mean-
while, transfers of IPR piracy cases from administrative authorities to
criminal authorities in China have steadily decreased.' 3 This might con-
firm Senator Max Baucus' comment during Ambassador Portman's
98. 60 Minutes H: The World's Greatest Fakes (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28,
2004), summary available at http://www.cbsnews.constories/2004/01/26/60I1I/main595875.
shtml.
99. China's Compliance with the WTO Agreement: Hearings Before the U.S. Trade
Representative 3 (2005) (testimony of Jeffrey Bernstein, Chairman, American Chamber of
Commerce Testimony) [hereinafter USTR Compliance Hearings].
100. Id. at 7 (testimony of U.S.-China Business Council).
101. Id.
102. 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 25, at 7. See also U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE 63-75 (2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/Reports-Publications/2005/asset-upload-fie29
3_8580.pdf. Some industries submitting responses for the 2005 Report included AmCham
Shanghai, American Apparel and Footwear Association, Coalition of Service Industries,
Dewey Ballantine LLP, International Intellectual Property Alliance, National Association of
Manufacturers, the Northern Mariana Islands, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, Stewart & Stewart LLP, U.S.-China Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
U.S. Grains Council, U.S. Information Technology Office, and the U.S. Council for Interna-
tional Business.
103. 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 25, at 5. Transfers declined from eighty-six
in 2001 to fifty-nine in 2002, forty-five in 2003, and only fourteen in the first half of 2004.
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confirmation hearings in April 2005 that he once spoke to Vice-Premier
Wu about China's IPR problem, but she "shrugged off' 
his concerns.04
Upon WTO accession, China agreed to submit to annual compliance
hearings in Geneva, called the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM).
These hearings provide a forum for WTO members to ask China about
IPR enforcement efforts. China continuously points out that it has had
only twenty years to develop an IPR regime, but many WTO members
have expressed dissatisfaction with Chinese efforts in the TRM hear-
ings.' 5 A survey of the 2003-2005 TRM hearings yields a disparate
outlook on Chinese IPR enforcement. At the 2003 TRM hearings, China
admitted that its legal and judicial infrastructure reduced the probability
that criminal IPR enforcement would follow administrative punish-
ment.'°6 Only twenty-two private criminal actions were initiated in 2003,
of which only eighteen related to producing and selling counterfeit prod-
ucts.'07 The Chinese delegate also stated that China was considering
criminalizing copyright violations not pursued for profit-he noted that
many WTO members did not have such a profit prerequisite for criminal
liability.'0 8 China has reported no follow-up on this assertion.
Addressing the profit thresholds, the Chinese delegate somewhat
vindicated the policy. He stated that the threshold figure could take into
account money or commodities, whether they counted for sales volume,
goods value and illegal profits, or damages.'0° This implied that the value
of unsold goods could be counted towards the threshold."0 The delegate
also offered unexceptional but promising data regarding criminal IP in-
fringement cases. In 1998, Chinese authorities handled 301 persons and
128 cases."' In 2000 this number rose to 379 persons and 248 cases, and
in 2002 the numbers jumped considerably to 702 persons and 408 cases.
Also, in 2002 Chinese customs seized 95.62 million renminbi worth of
counterfeit and pirated goods (as of December 31, 2002, roughly 11.6
million dollars)."' It remains unclear, however, how Chinese authorities
arrived at this figure. If they used the price of the pirated goods, as is
common practice, then the legitimate price (and thus value) could be far
higher.
104. Portman Confirmation Hearing, supra note 12, at 40.
105. 2004 TRMs, supra note 30, t 268-281.
106. 2003 Transitional Review Mechanism: Hearing Before the Council on the Trade-





110. December 2004 JI, supra note 80, art. 12 (confirming this issue).
111. 2003 TRMs, supra note 106, T 74.
112. Id. 179.
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In 2003 the National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC)
launched a "special" strike against piracy that coincided with the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Leader's Meeting. The strike
collected data from fourteen provinces and the four major centers of Bei-
jing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. This strike imposed a total fine
of 1.34 million renminbi (16,900 dollars), transferred a total of five cases
to judicial authorities, and investigated only one underground compact
disc press. These fines and enforcement actions resulted from a strike
that covered almost the entire country and investigated 2,588 markets,
thirty schools, seventy-seven "enterprises," and 1,430 infringing or pirat-
ing entities. The Japanese and U.S. delegations expressed their
displeasure over the laxitude of these measures at the 2003 TRM hear-
ings. ' Both delegations stated that deterrence was low in China and that
improvement of enforcement was of greatest importance to combating
counterfeiting in China.
The responses of Chinese authorities to questions at the 2003 TRM
hearings underscore the degree to which IPR enforcement in China re-
mains weak. Chinese authorities auction seized pirated goods and never
disclose where the proceeds go. In defense of such practices, a Chinese
official stated that destroying confiscated goods would waste natural re-
sources and cause environmental pollution."4 Instead, the Chinese official
stated that auctioning confiscated goods would "make full use of them,"
and that indicators of piracy would be removed to protect the rights holder.
The official did not explain how making "full use" of fake goods provides
any durable example of enforcement or deterrence, how signs of piracy
can be completely removed, or how the entire process protects the rights
holder and instills trust in the Chinese IPR enforcement system."
5
The 2004 TRM hearings were marked by similarly chaotic data,
adding more color to the already confusing canvas of Chinese IPR en-
forcement. A "special" IPR protection campaign had again yielded 4,036
trademark infringement cases with a total fine of nearly thirty million
renminbi (3.6 million dollars)."' 6 Copyright enforcement personnel inves-
tigated 8,000 software and audiovisual dealers and confiscated over 1.5
million pirated discs. Administrative enforcement measures yielded 472
trademark infringement cases and ninety-five copyright infringement
cases. 1 7 The Chinese delegate reported in the next paragraph that the
113. Id. 1 83, 90.
114. 2004 TRMs, supra note 30, 47.
115. 2005 Transitional Review Mechanism: Hearing Before the Council on the Trade-





Administrations of Industry and Commerce had handled a total of
51,411 cases of infringement during 2003 and early 2004."8 Almost 100
million instances of illegal trademark usage had been seized or removed,
the total value of which was 694 million renminbi (eighty-four million
dollars). Still, these massive seizures resulted in only fifty-nine cases
transferred for criminal liability.
Other questions about Chinese enforcement efforts went unanswered
at the 2004 TRM hearings. Similar cases were cited in different numerical
contexts, still with no mention of finality in criminal proceedings. 2,118
criminal suspects were arrested and 1,522 of those were prosecuted, but
there was no indication of the success of those prosecutions. Other cases
were mentioned as a "priority" and there had been "approval" to arrest
483 additional suspects. As with the 2003 TRMs, Japan and the United
States were the most vocal in claiming that Chinese IPR enforcement and
deterrence was ineffectual against the backdrop of skyrocketing losses." 9
The United States pointed out that China's criminal law raised significant
TRIPs issues by requiring a showing of profits for certain IPR offenses.
Most revealing at the 2004 TRM hearings was the example of the Bei-
jing Silk Market. The Chinese delegate commented on the infamy of the
Beijing Silk Market and how the market was renowned for fake prod-
ucts.' 20 The Beijing Administration of Industry and Commerce issued a
decree banning all sales of high-profile luxury goods such Prada and Bur-
berry in all markets of Beijing. The delegate then stated that "[v]endors
continuing to sell such commodities would be investigated as suspected
trademark infringers."' 2' But did conditions really change "dramatically,"
as the delegate claimed? 22 The delegate used these measures as examples
of China's strong commitment to combating IPR offences, but the ban was
obviously ineffective. The Silk Market was forced to close down later in
2004, but a new five-story Silk Market opened next to the old site, with
inspectors finding infringing goods on opening day. 123 Prada, Chanel,
Louis Vuitton, Gucci, and Burberry recently won a case in the Beijing
High People's Court against the Silk Market.
24
118. Id. E 242-43.
119. Id. It 272-74.
120. For a description of the market, see China Hotel Guide, http://www.chinatour.com/
attraction/xiushuidongjie.htm.
121. 2004 TRMs, supra note 30, 197.
122. Id.
123. Chinatour.com, Xiushui Dongjie Market (Silk Alley), Beijing, http://www.china
tour.com/attraction/xiushuidongjie.htm. See generally TheBeijingGuide.com, Silk Market
Beijing, http://www.thebeijingguide.com/shopping/silk-market.html (offering streaming pho-
tos of the new market that display brands such as The North Face, Calvin Klein, Lee, and
Levis).
124. See Silk Street Market Loses Appeal in Trademark Case, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 19, 2006.
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Despite the pervasiveness of infringement against non-Chinese
trademarks, only 10.6 percent of trademark investigations in 2004 in-
volved such trademarks.'25 Indeed, over ninety-eight percent of China's
administrative copyright cases were on behalf of Chinese rights hold-
ers. 26 Still, even if China's courts appear receptive to Chinese IPR cases,
they may not be adequately effective in handling them, as evidenced by
the fact that Chinese companies initiate trademark suits in U.S. courts.'27
The 2005 TRMs yielded little new data, as China chose to release
figures ahead of time within the TRM regime.2 8 The release is peculiar,
as it repeats all figures from 2004. Only one paragraph is dedicated to
2005 data, which shows a mid-year seizure of 1.33 billion renminbi (161
million dollars) and "redemptive" economic losses of up to 420 million
renminbi (50.8 million dollars). 9
V. CHINA'S FAILURE TO UPHOLD ITS WTO OBLIGATIONS
China does not meet the letter or spirit of Article 41's DEER rights.
This failure is evident in the ineffectiveness and imprecise language of the
criminal law, the arbitrary criminal thresholds of the December 2004 JI,
and the lack of significant criminal liability throughout Chinese IP law.
China essentially allows piracy not only to be affordable but also
highly profitable. As indicated above, thresholds for criminal liability for
piracy allow individual pirates to operate below the threshold and still
escape prison. The December 2004 JI also inexplicably differentiates
between individuals and business units, treating the latter more leniently
than the former without any logical justification. Furthermore, even if
the individual or the business is apprehended, the prices of the pirated
goods will be used to calculate damages, a far lower overall value than
the price of genuine goods.
China's IP laws deliver a clear message that IP piracy is not a crime
per se. Again, no consistent guidance is available on when IP piracy
125. Geoffrey Fowler, China's Logo Crackdown, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2005, at B 1. The
figure of 10.6% could have different origins. It may be that Chinese cases backing up in Chi-
nese courts mean foreign cases do not receive as much attention. Alternatively, the 10.6%
figure may hint at a national treatment issue, with Chinese courts simply placing a higher
priority on domestic trademark infringement. I am grateful to David Weller, former counsel at
the USTR, Office of China Affairs, for this comment.
126. 2005 TRMs, supra note 115, 169.
127. See Wuxi Multimedia, Ltd. v. Koninklijke Philips Elec., No. 04cv1136 DMS
(BLM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9160 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss second amended complaint).
128. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Transitional
Review Mechanism Council, Communication from China, IP/C/W/460 (Nov. 11, 2005).
129. Id.
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crosses the boundary into criminal conduct. China's Trademark Law
uses the pirate's profit to calculate damages, enabling the pirate to retain
investments in infrastructure. China's Patent Law allows either the pat-
entee's losses or the pirate's profits to be used as a basis for damage
calculation, but it gives no further guidance on when either standard is to
be used. The Copyright Law is mute on the seizure of infringing prod-
ucts, although it authorizes seizure of the instruments used to produce
the infringing products. Nowhere in China's IP Laws is illegal income
defined, and China's inherent bias toward profit suggests that infrastruc-
ture cost is left untouched, allowing pirates to make a comfortable
livelihood.
The above ambiguities and biases directly conflict with the WTO
TRIPs requirements for DEER rights, damages, supplemental remedies,
and criminal procedures. Clear signals are given that 1) pirates can stay
in business if they stay below the established unit thresholds (an Article
41 DEER rights violation); 2) the Chinese government will calculate
damages with little regard for the interests of the rights holder (an Article
45 Damages violation); and 3) the Chinese government has not decided
on whether piracy is actually a crime, regardless of profit motives (an
Article 61 "least standards" violation). Moreover, the removal of infring-
ing marks and "full use" of pirated products violates Article 46, which
empowers judicial authorities to dispose of infringing goods outside the
channels of commerce in order to create an effective deterrent to in-
fringement. Article 46 suggests that, absent constitutional limitations,
infringing goods should be destroyed. In any case, Article 53 of the Chi-
nese Trademark Law 13 states clearly that once infringement has been
established, the administrative authority shall confiscate and destroy the
infringing goods. China's own IP laws as well as WTO law therefore
preclude China from making "full use" of illegal products.
China also has failed to uphold its obligations under TRIPs Article
69 on international cooperation. This is evident not only in China's track
record of enforcement highlighted above, but also in specific responses
China has given outside the TRM hearings. In requests for transparency
in legislation, 13' the United States asked China to provide a copy of the
State Council's request to the Supreme People's Court to lower the
thresholds for criminal copyright violations and to advise what steps the
State Council would take to lower those thresholds (including requesting
an interpretation from the National People's Congress, revising prior
130. See Trademark Law (as amended by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2001) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.comenglish/lawslaws 1.htm.
131. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review of Legis-
lation: Responses from China to Questions Posed by Korea, Japan and the United States, 10,
IPICIWI374IAdd.2 (Oct. 14, 2002).
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guidance on criminal prosecution, or requesting that the Supreme Peo-
ple's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Supreme People's
Court issue a revised interpretation regarding criminal thresholds).32 In
response, China simply replied that it had already given the recommen-
dation to revise the judicial interpretation for criminal copyright
violations to the Supreme People's Court.
13
In another question posed to China, the United States asked whether
the unauthorized creation of a copy of a copyrighted work, such as in the
temporary memory of a computer in China, infringed the reproduction
right provided for in Article 10(5) of China's Copyright Law.' 34 China
brushed off the question, stating that there was no such a term as "tem-
porary memory" in the Copyright Law or TRIPS.'35 A substantive
response would have been helpful in assessing China's e-piracy envi-
ronment, especially with regard to temporary or trial versions of
software offered on the Internet.
On November 14, 2005, the United States, along with Japan and
Switzerland, issued a groundbreaking Request For Information Pursuant
To Article 63.3 of The TRIPs Agreement (Article 63 Request).' 36 In the
request, the United States asked for information regarding specific IP
piracy cases, methods of resolution, the nature of remedies, and the vari-
ous products the IP piracy cases affected. For China's convenience, the
United States cited specific documents submitted by China, provided
examples of possible responses, and allowed flexibility as to how China
could respond with statistical information. 37 China deflected the Article
63 Request by asking upon which of the only two Article 63 clauses the
United States based its request. China then cited to TRIPs Article 63.3 in
replying that while a WTO member had the right to request information,
China was under no obligation to honor the request. 38 Yet Article 63.3
specifically requires WTO members to be prepared to supply informa-





136. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Request For
Information Pursuant To Article 63.3 of the TRIPs Agreement-Communication from the
United States, IP/C/W/461 (Nov. 14, 2005).
137. The Article 63 Request merits considerable attention. In particular, the United
States provided eleven lines of clarification on its request, including seven choices for how
China could feasibly respond. Id. at n.3.
138. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Response to a
Request for Information Pursuant to Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement-Communication
from China, 8, IP/C/W/465 (Jan. 23, 2006).
139. TRIPs, supra note 57, art. 41(5).
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VI. DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS?
Unfortunately, examples of China's noncompliance with the WTO
TRIPs Agreement are abundant. In one case, the Shenzhen Reflective
Materials Institute was found to have pirated approximately 650,000 Mi-
crosoft holograms, normally used to identify legitimate Microsoft
software discs. The damages resulting from the fraudulent placement of
these holograms on copies of Microsoft software were estimated at 30-
180 million dollars. Yet the Shenzhen Institute was ordered to pay dam-
ages of 260 dollars.' 4° How can these trifling punishments prevent further
infringements of DEER rights? What can China offer as a justification
for its failure to protect such rights under TRIPs?
A. Paper Defense
China can bring forth little in its defense. The TRIPs Agreement pro-
vides scant cover for lackluster IPR enforcement. Article 73 (Security
Exceptions) gives no indication that environmental concerns or natural
resources are sound justifications for allowing pirated material to return
to the channels of commerce.'4 ' Article 46 allows existing constitutional
requirements and the interests of third parties to be accounted for when
considering effective deterrents to infringement. It would be indeed dif-
ficult for China to point to Chinese citizens as third parties whose
interests prevent the destruction of pirated goods. Perhaps a more tenable
but nonetheless unconvincing argument would be for China to posit that
the piracy industry employs its massive migrant population-which may
number around 200 million, or one-sixth of the national population'
4- -
and that to put so many out of work would lead to nationwide chaos.
Could China claim there is an obsessive focus on its judicial system
with regard to IP enforcement? TRIPs Article 41(5) states that general
obligations of enforcement do not command any WTO member to dis-
tinguish between general law enforcement efforts and IP enforcement,
nor must states distinguish in resource distribution between IP and gen-
eral law enforcement.4 1 China could credibly argue that its entire judicial
system is undergoing monumental changes, and that IPR protection
could be a temporary casualty while the judicial system completes this
transformation.
140. Glenn Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China:
Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1081, 1099 (1996).
141. 2004 TRMs, supra note 30, at 47.
142. Embassy of the P.R.C. in the U.S., Migrant Workers Gaining Improved Status, Feb.
3, 2006, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t233671 .htm.
143. TRIPs, supra note 57, art. 41(5).
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Still, China easily defends its own intellectual property, and so far
authorities have been extremely effective in minimizing piracy for sales
of Beijing 2008 Olympic merchandise. " China has even passed a sepa-
rate law governing protection of Olympic IPR. 45 The law contains higher
punishments than other IP laws, imposes fines even when no illegal in-
come is seized, 46 and calculates damages with the original Olympic
item's licensing fee, instead of the pirate price. This regulation indicates
that authorities are indeed capable of instituting meaningful and effective
IP protection,"17 but the disparity between it and Chinese law that applies
to non-Chinese IP is a stark indication of Chinese bias in IPR enforce-
ment and an apparent violation of the national treatment requirement in
TRIPs Article 3.148
In addition to the will, China possesses the means to combat IP pi-
racy. China's 2004 GDP was 1.65 trillion dollars and the 2005 figure was
approximately 2.26 trillion dollars. 49 According to the World Bank,
China is a lower-middle income country50 and is now the world's fourth
largest economy.'' China's foreign currency reserves are quickly ap-
proaching one trillion dollars, more than five times that of the United
States.'52 China's exports of 593 billion dollars in 2004 surpassed those
of Japan and are quickly catching up to U.S. global exports. These eco-
nomic data suggest China will not long be able to invoke its status as a
developing country as an excuse for weak IPR enforcement.
It is notable that China sometimes takes full credit for IPR enforce-
ment where only partial credit is due. A 2005 IP piracy case involved two
144. Fowler, supra note 125.
145. See Regulations on the Protection of Olympic Symbols (promulgated by Decree
No. 345 of the State Council of the P.R.C., Feb. 4, 2002, effective Apr. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws2l.htm.
146. Id. art. 10.
147. The Deputy Director of Legal Affairs for the Beijing Olympic Committee has ad-
mitted that the Committee has no fixed assets, and thus the logo itself is the most valuable
asset the Committee owns. Chinese retailers also admit that the deterrent effect of punish-
ments for pirating Beijing Olympics logos and products prevents them from selling illegal
Olympic products. Fowler, supra note 125.
148. TRIPs, supra note 57, art. 3(1).
149. See Hong Kong Trade Dev. Council, Market Profile on Chinese Mainland,
http://www.tdctrade.com/main/china.htm#l.
150. World Bank Group, Country Groups, http://www.worldbank.org (click "Data &
Statistics"; then "Data"; then "Country Classification"; then "View All Groups" hyperlink)
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
151. See WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD BANK 2005 GDP RANKINGS (2005); see also
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS) & INSTITUTE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS (ilE), CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET 4 (2006).
152. WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD BANK 2004 GDP-PPP RANKINGS 7 (2004).
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U.S. citizens, Randolph Guthrie and Abram Thrush (the Guthrie case). 53
The case started in the United States at a flea market when U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel purchased pirated
movies. The case finally closed in a Shanghai court, where both U.S.
citizens and their Chinese accomplices were sentenced to imprisonment
and fines. In the 2005 TRM hearings, the Chinese delegate claimed that
the Guthrie case investigation and apprehension was the result of "well-
designed Chinese IPR laws and regulations."'4 What the Chinese dele-
gate neglected to mention was that the case began in the United States,
and Chinese authorities received most of their information from U.S.
ICE agents, the Beijing ICE Attach6, and the Motion Picture Association
of America.
Will the United States take Beijing to Geneva? The USTR recently
issued a "Top-to-Bottom Review" entitled U.S.-China Trade Relations:
Entering a New Phase of Greater Accountability and Enforcement.'5 In
this release, the USTR signaled that patience with China is indeed run-
ning thin. The USTR labeled the current period of U.S.-China trade
relations as the "third phase,"'' 1 6 in which the United States will employ
greater monitoring, enforcement, and accountability standards toward
China. Through these efforts, the United States clearly aims to expand
multilateral cooperation, strengthen U.S. interagency efforts, and in-
crease the effectiveness of U.S.-China dialogue.' The USTR also has
created a China Enforcement Task Force, headed by a Chief Counsel for
China Trade Enforcement. 58 This task force will "focus on the prepara-
tion and handling of potential WTO cases with China."'5 9
In June 2006, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission held a hearing on "China's Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights and the Dangers of the Movement of Counterfeited and Pirated
Goods into the United States."' Timothy Stratford, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for China, indicated that a WTO IPR case was in the ad-
vanced stages of discussion. 6' Stratford reiterated that the United States
has not seen a significant shift towards Chinese criminal enforcement of
153. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Two Americans Con-
victed In China of Operating Major Counterfeit Motion Picture Network (Apr. 19, 2005),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pilnews/newsreleases/articles/20050419washington.pdf.
154. 2005 TRMs, supra note 115, 74.
155. USTR 2006 TOP-To-BOTTOM REVIEW, supra note 2.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id. at 5-6.
158. Id. at 24.
159. USTR 2006 TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW, supra note 2, at 24.
160. For the full agenda of the hearing, including testifying officials, see http://www.
uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/hrO6 06 08_09.php.
161. Doug Palmer, WTO Case Against China Piracy "very possible," REUTERS, June 7,
2006.
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IPR and that Chinese officials still depend on administrative channels.
62
Other U.S. trade officials echo these sentiments. Chris Israel, U.S. Coor-
dinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement, stated to the
commission that the United States is the only country to have filed a
WTO case against China, and "is again left with no choice but to con-
sider filing another complaint against China this time for inadequate
enforcement of IPR."'
163
In some ways, the intellectual property rights stolen by China's pi-
rates could be compared to the claws and fangs that Chairman Mao
hoped to take away from United States, which he called a Paper Tiger.
'64
Senator Carl Levin used the same moniker at the abovementioned hear-
ing to criticize the lack of action by the United States against China in
the WTO., 65 The United States could shed its image as a Paper Tiger by
taking the Paper Dragon to task for blatant TRIPs violations.
162. Hearing on China's Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and the Dangers of
the Movement of Counterfeited and Pirated Goods into the United States Before the U.S.-
China Economic & Security Review Comm., June 7-8, 2006 [hereinafter Hearing on China's
Enforcement] (statement of Timothy P. Stratford, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative at 7),
available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written-testimonies/06_06_07wrts/
Stratfordtimothy.pdf.
163. Id. (statement of Chris Israel, U.S. Coord. for International Intellectual Property
Enforcement at 7), available at http://www.uscc.govlhearingsl2006hearings/writtentestimo-
nies/06_06_07wrts/06 06 7_8_israelchris.php.
164. See Mao Ze Dong, U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger (July 14, 1956), available at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5-52.htm.
165. Hearing on China's Enforcement, supra note 162 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, at
3), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/writtentestimonies/06_06_07
wrts/06_06_7_8_levincarl.pdf.
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